The politics of patents and drugs in Brazil and Mexico: the industrial bases of health policies by Shadlen, Kenneth C.
  
Kenneth C. Shadlen
The politics of patents and drugs in Brazil 
and Mexico: the industrial bases of health 
policies 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
Original citation: 
Shadlen, Kenneth C. (2009) The politics of patents and drugs in Brazil and Mexico: the industrial 
bases of health policies. Comparative politics, 42 (1). pp. 41-58. 
 
© 2009 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27051/
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2010 
 
Available with the permission of the Journal of Comparative Politics. 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some differences between 
this version and the published version may remain.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
The Politics of Patents and Drugs in 
Brazil and Mexico: 
 
The Industrial Bases of Health Policies 
 
Kenneth C. Shadlen 
 
 
Intellectual property (IP) policies influence trajectories of industrial development and 
capacities to address humanitarian concerns. As pillars of national systems of innovation, 
IP regimes drive technological change through their effect on knowledge-creation and 
knowledge-diffusion. By affecting access to technologically intensive goods, such as 
pharmaceuticals, IP regimes influence national public health programs. This article 
bridges these dimensions. Analysis of the politics of drug patents in Brazil and Mexico 
shows that how IP affects the industrial sector, particularly the pharmaceutical industry, 
establishes the political-economic parameters affecting countries’ abilities to use IP to 
promote public health. 
Prior to the 1990s neither Brazil nor Mexico (nor many other developing countries) 
granted patents on pharmaceuticals.1 Local firms could produce generic versions of new 
drugs that typically were patented in the OECD.2 In the 1990s both countries introduced 
pharmaceutical patents to comply with new international obligations. The World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) and the IP provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) prohibit countries from declaring pharmaceuticals nonpatentable; and the 
agreements require countries to provide patent holders with strong rights of exclusion over 
the knowledge contained in the patent. Providing market exclusivity to owners of drugs 
can raise prices, place drugs out of consumers’ reach, and strain governments’ health 
budgets.3 Not surprisingly, the introduction of drug patents was followed by backlash, and 
by the late 1990s policymakers in many developing countries faced pressures to modify 
their new IP systems. 
Policy in Brazil and Mexico took different courses in response to this changing 
scenario. Brazil adjusted the IP system to ameliorate the effects that drug patents can have 
on prices and access; Mexico introduced few adjustments, and where changes were 
introduced they tended to reinforce and intensify the effects of drug patents. Variation in 
IP policy can be considered along three dimensions: what knowledge can be owned as 
property, the rights of owners versus users of property, and the effective duration of 
property owners’ rights. In Brazil obtaining private ownership over knowledge in the 
realm of pharmaceuticals has become more difficult, and the rights of third parties to use 
knowledge simplified. In Mexico impediments have been raised to third parties’ rights to 
use knowledge, and the effective length of protection extended. 
One seemingly obvious explanation for these differences is that Mexico is in 
NAFTA, while Brazil has no external obligations beyond its membership in the WTO. 
Although NAFTA places greater restrictions on IP policy, reliance on NAFTA as an 
explanatory factor is inadequate. Differences in the two countries’ international legal 
obligations cannot explain the divergence. If it were the case that the reforms introduced 
by Brazil would, were they transferred to Mexico, violate NAFTA, then NAFTA could 
partially account for the divergence; it could tell us that Mexico could not take the same 
path as Brazil on account of its “WTO-Plus” commitments. But the reforms introduced by 
Brazil would not violate NAFTA; legally, Mexico could imitate Brazil. Moreover, a strict 
emphasis on NAFTA cannot explain why Mexico reformed its IP system by moving in the 
opposite direction as Brazil. Mexico did not simply fail to emulate Brazil’s IP move from 
away from “TRIPS-Plus” but rather moved to an extended version of TRIPS-Plus. 
Nor can the outcome be explained by focusing on political bias.4 To be sure, the 
Brazilian governments in the period under study (Cardoso, 1994–2002; Lula, 2002 to the 
present) were more left-leaning than their Mexican counterparts (Zedillo, 1994–2000; Fox 
2000–2006), which perhaps might lead us to expect Brazil to prioritize health. Yet the 
major health-oriented reforms occurred under President Cardoso, the more centrist of the 
two Brazilian presidents. This is the same Cardoso that championed the original TRIPS-
Plus patent law in 1996, and the subsequent policy shift is not linked to prior changes in 
ideological disposition or political bias. In Mexico the right-leaning Fox government 
introduced progressive reforms to the health system to make access to health care a citizen-
based rather than employment-based right.5 
A political economy explanation for Brazil and Mexico’s divergent trajectories of 
patent policy focuses on the actors pushing for reform and patterns of coalitional 
formation and political mobilization. In both countries, drug patents and high prices 
yielded initiatives for health-oriented IP reform. What varies is who led these initiatives 
and the extent to which important actors in local pharmaceutical sectors were available as 
coalition partners. In Brazil the existence of an economically and politically more 
autonomous local pharmaceutical sector allowed the Ministry of Health to build a 
coalition in support of IP reform. In Mexico fundamental transformations of the 
pharmaceutical sector yielded a different terrain. In fact, the reform project in Mexico 
became commandeered by IP owners and ultimately had the perverse effect of reinforcing 
the system that was challenged. 
Of course, the transformation of Mexico’s pharmaceutical sector is not unrelated to 
NAFTA, which introduced substantial tariff reduction and revisions to government 
procurement practices that previously afforded special treatment to local firms. These 
broad shifts in policy, including pharmaceutical patent protection, induced changes to 
Mexico’s industrial sector that would ultimately restrict the realm of feasible policy 
alternatives. NAFTA is indeed significant, then, but in a broad political economy sense. A 
lesson of this article for scholars of international and comparative political economy is that 
we need to reorient our attention from the legal to the political economy aspects of 
international agreements—that is, not the rules per se but how such agreements unleash 
economic and social changes that in turn affect policy choices. 
This article also presents lessons for analysts relying on models of policy diffusion.6 
Diffusion models depict policymaking as an interdependent and interactive process, in 
which the likelihood that a given policy will be adopted in one country is a function of its 
adoption (or nonadoption) in other countries. Some analysts apply this logic to the case of 
IP and drugs. Nunn et al. suggest that Brazilian officials learned from Thailand’s example 
of using IP regulations to challenge transnational pharmaceutical firms’ pricing practices.7 
Cohen and Lybecker suggest that the Brazilian example of health-oriented IP reform can 
lead other countries to act similarly, citing Mexico as a country so inspired by Brazil.8  
Indeed, learning from members of countries’ “peer groups” is a principal mechanism of 
diffusion in this literature. 
Although the idea of reforming the IP system for public health purposes diffused from 
Brazil to Mexico, the policy did not. The legislative initiative proposed to modify 
Mexico’s patent system made explicit reference to the Brazilian experience that was to be 
replicated. But once the diffused idea placed IP on the political agenda in Mexico, the 
initiative became commandeered by those who wanted Mexico’s patent rules to be made 
more useful for patent-holding firms to strengthen their property rights and ward off 
competition than for the government to negotiate price reductions. The product of 
diffusion was not Mexico adopting policies that worked in Brazil, but rather policies that 
were the mirror image of those in Brazil. The explanation for this difference is in the 
identity of the actors receiving and attempting to implement the diffused idea of health- 
oriented IP, and the availability of powerful alliance partners for those actors advocating 
reform. This article thus provides a caution against overstating the significance of ideas 
and policy communities, and calls for renewed attention to traditional variables such as 
interests and resources. 
 
 
Patents, Pharmaceuticals, and Health Policy 
 
Prior to explaining the different policy trajectories experienced by Brazil and Mexico in 
health-related dimensions of IP, it is important to understand the range of variation. In this 
section a framework is provided that allows us to conceptualize variation with regard to 
patents, pharmaceuticals, and health policy.9 
Patents confer limited rights of exclusion over inventions that are novel and non- 
obvious and have industrial utility. Although granting a patent turns knowledge into 
private property, the rights of owners over their property are limited in that they are not 
automatic, not absolute, and not permanent. Patents are granted only where applicants 
demonstrate that their inventions satisfy the criteria of patentability. With application and 
examination central and prior to the process of establishing ownership, governments can 
control what knowledge becomes private property within their territory. Because the 
establishment of ownership follows and depends on the examination of patent 
applications, governments can control what knowledge becomes private property within 
their territory. Another limitation is that patent rights include various exceptions to patent 
holders’ ability to control the use and distribution of their property. Patent regimes include 
provisions by which third parties can, without requesting permission, use knowledge that 
is owned by someone else. They also include provisions that allow third parties to receive 
permission from the state to use other actors’ privately owned knowledge in ways that 
would otherwise constitute violations of patent holders’ rights. Lastly, patents expire. At 
some point the private property enters the public domain, where access to and use of the 
knowledge is unrestricted. 
These three limitations map onto lines of political conflict over what can be owned 
privately, between the rights of owners and users of private property, and over the duration 
of rights. These lines of conflict, in turn, map roughly onto axes of policy variation10. The 
rows in Table 1 take us from a limitation to a political conflict and then provide health-
related policy examples. 
 
 
Table 1 Law, Politics, and Health Policy 
 
Limitations Political Conflict Health-Related Policy Areas 
Not automatic What can be owned Pharmaceutical patents 
“Pipeline patents” 
Not Absolute Rights of owners vs. users Compulsory licenses 
Parallel imports 
Not Permanent Duration of rights Post-patent generic entry (early 
working provisions, drug 
registration procedures) 
 
With regard to conflicts over what sort of knowledge can be owned privately, the 
most important policy issue is whether or not countries grant pharmaceutical patents. As 
indicated, many developing countries did not do so prior to the 1990s, but TRIPS (and 
NAFTA) requires that countries grant patents on pharmaceutical products and processes.11 
A second policy issue is how to deal with inventions that are not new but that were 
not patented when they were new because the previous regime did not allow the sort of 
knowledge to be patented. If a country began granting pharmaceutical patents in 1995, for 
example, a drug invented in 1990 would not have been eligible for a patent when it was 
new. The novelty requirement would also make the drug unpatentable in 1995, even with 
the introduction of pharmaceutical patents, because it was no longer new. Since drugs are 
patented before marketing authority is secured, the 1990 drug would most likely be 
undergoing clinical trials in 1995—it would be in the “pipeline.” How do countries 
introducing pharmaceutical patents treat drugs in the pipeline? On this dimension NAFTA 
exceeds TRIPS by obligating countries to offer “pipeline patents.”12 
Policy areas that correspond to conflicts over the rights of owners versus users 
concern compulsory licenses (CLs) and parallel imports. CLs allow domestic entities 
(public or private) to import, produce, and distribute patented goods without the patent 
holders’ consent. TRIPS and NAFTA allow countries to determine the grounds on which 
they grant CLs, provided that a set of procedural conditions (such as prior negotiations 
with the patent holder and payment of royalties).13 In the case of CLs granted during times 
of national emergency or for government use, countries are released from the obligation of 
prior negotiations.14 Because potential delays introduced by negotiations are removed with 
this latter type of CL, these CLs are easier and quicker to grant and, arguably, most 
relevant for discussions of health. 
Parallel importation consists of allowing patented goods to enter the market once 
patent holders have placed the goods on the market elsewhere. Parallel imports can help 
ensure affordability of patented products by facilitating arbitrage and thus constraining 
patent holders’ ability to set monopoly prices. TRIPS allows countries to engage in parallel 
importation by adopting international doctrines of patent exhaustion; that is, once products 
are placed on the international market, patent holders’ exclusive rights are exhausted. 
NAFTA prohibits parallel importation by requiring national doctrines of patent exhaustion. 
Health-related policy areas corresponding to conflicts over the length of rights regard 
post-patent generic entry. When patents expire and knowledge enters the public domain, 
new actors gain rights to participate in markets that were reserved for patent holders. How 
quickly new actors enter markets and the subsequent competitive effects are felt in terms 
of reduced prices depends on a number of important policies, particularly early working 
provisions and procedures for registering generic drugs. Early working provisions allow 
firms to use patented knowledge and produce generic versions of patented drugs to obtain 
marketing approval once patents expire.15 Without such provisions firms might be 
infringing patents by producing generic versions prior to the patents’ expiration. Yet if 
firms must wait until patents expire to produce generic versions and apply to health 
authorities for authorization, patent terms are effectively extended by the amount of time it 
takes to complete these not-insignificant steps. Early working provisions, then, by 
allowing generic firms to use patented knowledge to prepare for market entry, can expedite 
competition at the point that patents expire. TRIPS and NAFTA both permit early working 
provisions.16 
Some pharmaceutical firms opt to launch generic versions prior to the end of patent 
terms, believing that their follow-on products do not infringe existing patents or that the 
patents in question are invalid. Since marketing drugs depends on authorization from 
health authorities, the subsequent question is whether and how the activities of IP and 
health officials are coordinated. Neither TRIPS nor NAFTA addresses this. More recently, 
the United States has pushed strongly for a form of coordination known as “linkage,” 
whereby health authorities consult with IP authorities and deny registration to drugs when 
patents are in force. While this form of coordination seems unproblematic on the face of it 
(if the drug is patented, then the sale of generic versions would be illegal), many 
developing countries resist pressures to proceed in this direction, arguing that linkage 
inappropriately transfers the burden of defending patents from the private rights-holder to 
the public. In any case, this form of linkage, though included in more recent regional and 
bilateral trade agreements (RBTAs) negotiated with the United States, is not in NAFTA. 
Table 2 contrasts the WTO and NAFTA with regard to the health-policy dimensions 
of the two agreements’ IP provisions. While it is clear that there are differences, such as 
pipeline patents and parallel imports, the similarities are certainly greater. 
 
 
Table 2 IP and Health Policy: WTO vs. NAFTA 
 
Policy Issue WTO (TRIPS) NAFTA (Chapter 17) 
Pharmaceutical patents Required (product and process) – 
Pipeline patents Not required Required 
Compulsory licenses Permitted; ample discretion – 
Parallel imports Permitted Not permitted 
Early working provisions Permitted – 
Drug registration procedures Not addressed – 
Note: – indicates that NAFTA and TRIPS are identical 
 
 
The WTO’s and NAFTA’s provisions indicate the parameters of what countries can 
and cannot do, but not what they actually do. Table 3 presents the main characteristics of the 
Brazilian and Mexican patent regimes implemented in the 1990s. Both countries greatly 
exceeded their new obligations, making ownership easy to obtain over a wide variety of 
pharmaceutical and pharmochemical products and processes, and giving owners strong and 
effectively long rights of exclusion. From a public health perspective, both countries’ patent 
regimes were worrisome. For example, both countries offered pipeline patents, neither allowed 
parallel imports, both had only rudimentary mechanisms for compulsory licenses to deal with 
health concerns, and neither had early working provisions. As a result of these “TRIPS Plus” 
patent regimes, more drugs would become patented in both countries and it would be difficult 
to rely on generic competition to reduce prices. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, the 
two countries diverge in dramatic fashion. The subsequent sections explain this 
divergence, drawing our attention to the important role of local pharmaceutical industries 
in coalitions for health-oriented patent reform. 
 
 
Table 3 Health-Related IP Policy: Common Origins 
 
Policy Brazil Mexico 
Pharmaceutical patents Yes (1997) Yes (1991) 
“Pipeline patents” Yes (1996) Yes (1991) 
Compulsory licenses Yes (basic, Art. 77) Yes (basic, Art. 71) 
Parallel imports No No 
Early working provisions No No 
Linkage No No 
Note: The shaded text indicates important differences. 
Brazil: From TRIPS  Plus to “TRIPS  Just” 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, health-related aspects of Brazil’s patent regime under- went 
substantial modifications. Obtaining pharmaceutical patents was made more difficult, the patent 
law was modified to facilitate government efforts to lower prices through compulsory licensing, 
and the government enacted measures to encourage competition with generics. The nature of 
the Brazilian government’s demand for patented and expensive drugs made health-
oriented IP reform a high priority, and the political organization and structure of the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry made reform politically feasible. 
The Brazilian government’s demand for drugs was strong and relatively inelastic to 
price on account of the Ministry of Health’s (MH) extensive obligations to provide free 
medicines. These obligations are rooted in the 1988 Constitution, which establishes the 
right to health, including access to essential medicines through the new national health 
care system (SUS) as a universal right. Government demand was particularly shaped by 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Although Brazil’s adult prevalence rate of 0.6 percent is not 
particularly high by international standards, the country stands out for its early (since 
the late 1980s) and comprehensive approach toward prevention and treatment. 
Importantly, a 1996 Law guaranteed free antiretroviral (ARV) treatment through the 
MH’s National HIV/AIDS Program, and intense social mobilization further 
reinforced the government’s obligations.17 
Brazil’s approach to HIV/AIDS treatment affected the government’s demand in 
such a way as to make IP reform an imperative. Because ARVs treat but do not cure 
HIV/AIDS, they need to be taken indefinitely; and patients need to change treatment 
regimens as immunities develop. By the late 1990s the annual per patient cost of 
treatment in Brazil was nearly US$5,000 and ARVs already consumed one-third of 
the MH’s drug budget, and this was at a time when treatment featured almost 
exclusively unpatented drugs. As more people began treatment and as patients 
migrated to expensive second-line regimens based on drugs that were patented under 
Brazil’s new IP law, the program would be unsustainable.18 
Since 1999, then, the government took a range of measures to improve the capacity 
of the National HIV/AIDS Program (and the SUS more generally) to acquire less ex- 
pensive, generic versions of newer drugs from both foreign and local suppliers. The MH’s 
initiative to lower costs via promotion of generics led to three important modifications of 
Brazil’s new IP system: health authorities gained prominence in reviewing patent 
applications, compulsory licensing provisions were made more flexible and easier to 
use, and regulatory reforms were introduced to expedite post-patent generic entry. 
Any pharmaceutical patent application that is approved by the National Institute for 
Industrial Property (INPI) is sent to the MH for review. The patent is issued only after IP 
officials in the Ministry’s health surveillance agency (ANVISA) issue “prior consent.”19 
This reform, introduced by decree by President Cardoso in 1999 and converted into law 
in 2001, aimed to provide the MH with an instrument to influence the patent 
examination process, influence that it would otherwise lack on account of INPI being 
situated within a different ministry. 
The prior consent requirement makes it more difficult to obtain private rights of 
exclusion over knowledge for pharmaceuticals. Many patent applications are not for 
new molecular entities (NMEs) but rather revised versions of NMEs that are already 
patented, raising the question of how patent examiners define “novelty.”20 ANVISA’s 
health-focused examination is significantly stricter than INPI’s.21 Whereas INPI is 
criticized by health activists and lawyers for adopting an overly broad definition of 
novelty, ANVISA denies patents to drugs that lack “genuine” novelty and where it 
adjudges that providing exclusive rights would be harmful to public health. Typically 
ANVISA uses its authority to prevent patents that, by its judgment, would extend the 
terms of existing patents.22 As Table 4 indicates, 53 applications approved by INPI have 
been rejected by ANVISA since the prior consent process was initiated in 2001. Perhaps 
more critically, of the 68.9 percent of the applications that ANVISA has approved, in 
42 percent of these cases the applicant first had to reduce the breadth of the patent’s 
claims.23 
 
 
Table 4 ANVISA’s Prior Consent (through July 2008) 
 
Decision Number of Cases Percentage 
Approvals 752 68.9 
Denials 53 4.9 
Pending (as of July 2008) 122 11.2 
Other* 165 15.1 
Total 1092 100.0 
*Includes applications returned to INPI for further documentation and because determined 
not to be pharmaceutical patent applications 
Source: ANVISA 
 
 
No aspect of the global politics of IP has received so much attention as compulsory 
licenses, and Brazil has been at the forefront of these debates. The 1996 LPI includes 
multiple articles that address CLs, the most significant for our purposes being Article 71 
covering national emergencies and situations of “public interest.” Presidential directives 
in 1999 and 2003 reformed Article 71 to make it more useful and thus increase the 
MH’s capacity to leverage price reductions from patent-holding pharmaceutical firms.24 
These revisions gave clearer definitions of national emergency and public interest and 
simplified the mechanism for issuing CLs by giving the MH greater authority to act. 
Importantly, the 2003 directive stipulates that private firms supplying the government 
constitutes “public use” and is thus acceptable under Article 71, and also requires patent 
owners to transfer technological knowledge in the case of CLs.25 
The threat of a CL is a bargaining tool used to entice patent holders to make their 
products available at lower prices. The effectiveness of the bargaining tool, however, depends 
on the credibility of the threat. The reforms to Article 71 make the Brazilian government’s 
threats more credible by making CLs easier to issue and less vulnerable to appeal, and by 
increasing the government’s ability to secure the relevant drugs from alternative 
suppliers. 
Since 2001 the MH has repeatedly used the CL instruments to obtain price reductions on 
second-line ARVs that consume a disproportionate share of the MH’s drug budget. The key 
ARVs (patent holders) are efavirenz (Merck), lopinavir/ritonavir (Abbott), and Nelfinavir 
(Roche), which account for roughly 60 percent of the government’s ARV expenditures. In 
August 2001, for example, the MH announced it would issue a compulsory license on 
nelfinavir, and Roche responded by reducing the price. Similar episodes occurred with 
Roche and Abbott, with Merck in 2003, and then again with Abbott in 2005. In 
2007, following protracted negotiations with Merck, Brazil issued a CL on efavirenz. 
Note that these drugs are patented in Brazil because of the inclusion of pipeline patents in 
the 1996 LPI. Thus, to an important extent, the reforms to, and exercise of, the CL 
provisions can be understood as efforts to ameliorate the effects of the TRIPS Plus LPI. 
Negotiations have not always been entirely successful. The 2005 agreement with Abbott 
left the price of lopinavir/ritonavir well above Abbott’s most discounted international price, for 
example, and the MH is widely criticized for not issuing more CLs.26 Yet the MH’s 
strategy, its shortcomings notwithstanding, has resulted in significant cost savings, even as 
patented second-line treatments play increasingly greater roles in the national treatment 
program.27 In fact, while the affordability of second-line ARVs provided the main impetus for 
IP reform, the modifications have yielded lower drug prices across the board.28 
The Brazilian strategy to introduce generic competition also included amending the 
1996 LPI to introduce an early working provision, which allows generic firms to prepare 
for market entry at the moment of patent expiration.29 Importantly, Brazilian authorities 
refuse to adjust terms for patents granted under the pipeline mechanism. That is, if a 
patent had a priority date from its application in the United States of January 31, 1987, 
for example, and was granted in Brazil under the pipeline mechanism in 1999, the 
patent would be due to expire in both the United States and Brazil on the same day, 
January 30, 2007. And even if the United States were to extend the expiry date by 
two years, until January 2009, it would still expire in 2007 in Brazil. The transnational 
sector pushes strongly for adjusting patent terms in this way and regularly demands this in 
court, but doing so is not the norm in Brazil.30  The bias against adjustments of patent terms 
provides generic producers with incentives to utilize the early working provision. The 
effectiveness of the system is further enhanced by ANVISA’s policy of granting rapid approval 
of products that satisfy health criteria, leaving questions of potential patent infringement to 
be contested in courts. 
While the nature of demand has driven the Brazilian government to introduce 
these health-oriented IP reforms, the support of the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector 
makes doing so feasible. The reforms, not surprisingly, have drawn strong criticism 
from the transnational pharmaceutical sector from both its representatives in Brazil 
(INTERFARMA) and the United States (PhRMA). Actors that once heaped praise on 
Brazil for its “modern” 1996 LPI now complain of piracy and theft.31 But these attacks do 
not isolate the government, which can rest on the support of a coalition of actors representing 
the national pharmochemical (ABIFINA) and pharmaceutical (ALANAC, ALFOB, and 
ProGenéricos) producers. These organizations—some of which unsuccessfully resisted the 
1996 LPI—act as a bulwark against INTERFARMA, consistently presenting positions 
contrary to those of the transnational sector. When INTERFARMA assailed the reforms 
introduced in 1999 and 2000 or the 2007 CL, for example, ABIFINA quickly came to 
the MH’s defense.32 
The existence of a coalition supportive of health-oriented IP reforms is partially a 
function of state policy. After all, the local pharmaceutical sector benefited from 
significant government investment in research and production, much of it through the 
MH itself.33 The Ministry, acting as “health entrepreneur,” does not just purchase 
drugs but also takes an active role in their production.34 Public sector labs are important 
suppliers to the government, and, earlier in the production chain, the state works with 
private firms to help them develop synthesis technologies, produce necessary 
intermediates, and acquire capacities for reverse-engineering active principal 
ingredients (APIs). 
Economic and technological collaboration between the public and private sectors 
created conditions for a political alliance and hospitable ground for the government’s 
health-oriented IP reforms. The transnational sector opposed the government at nearly 
every step, but INTERFARMA does not monopolize the sector politically. The 
existence of a national pharmaceutical sector with interests distinct from the 
transnationals and with productive capacity retained from an earlier period of 
industrialization presented the MH with friendly and cooperative interlocutors. Indeed, 
the 2003 presidential directive on CLs was drafted by a lawyer who works as an advisor 
to ABIFINA.35 
It is essential to emphasize that the virtuous circle, whereby the government invests 
in industry and industry supports the government’s IP reforms, is possible because of 
the condition of the local pharmaceutical sector. Even with the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents and in the context of trade liberalization and an overvalued 
currency, Brazilian firms retained market share in the 1990s. By the time health-related 
IP reforms became politically salient, local firms still accounted for roughly one-quarter 
of sales and dominated the nascent generics market, and pharmochemical firms 
retained twice the market share of Chinese and Indian combined imports.36 A critical 
point here is the remaining capacity to produce final drugs and APIs, which is a legacy 
of the importsubstituting period, particularly the push for backward integration of the 
pharmaceutical sector in the 1980s.37 Furthermore, the “late” introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents in 1997 meant that the potential denationalizing effects had not 
yet materialized.38 Because Brazilian firms were still capable of benefiting from the 
government’s strategy, they were available alliance partners. 
 
 
Mexico: From  TRIPS  Plus to NAFTA Plus 
 
Policy in Mexico followed a fundamentally different trajectory. Whereas Brazil 
implemented reforms to ameliorate the effects of patents on drug prices, Mexico’s 
policies reinforce these effects. Changes to Mexico’s patent law make use more difficult 
and complicate the process by which CLs can be issued, and modest steps to encourage 
post-patent generic competition were introduced in a self-undermining fashion. The 
explanation for this different path is rooted in the Mexican government’s less 
comprehensive response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which made IP reforms less 
compelling, and in the transformations of the pharmaceutical sector, which not only 
made coalition-building for health-oriented IP reform less feasible but facilitated a 
countermobilization on the part of patent owners. 
Although the affordability of medicines became a prominent issue in Mexico in the 
late 1990s, as prices increased significantly above the rate of inflation in the years 
following the 1994 devaluation of the peso, the nature of government demand reduced 
the sensitivity to such changes. State provision of discounted and free medicines was 
far from universal, extending only to workers in the formal sector (IMSS) and 
government employees (ISSSTE). Nor did Mexico’s Secretariat of Health (SH) face 
Brazilian-like obligations with regard to ARVs. Most HIV/AIDS treatment was 
provided outside of the state system and the uninsured generally lacked access.39 Thus, 
the SH had less cause for alarm in the face of higher prices and less motive to reform 
the patent system. 
Rather than coming from within government, the initiative for health-oriented 
patent reform came from a segment of the local pharmaceutical sector that emerged in 
the 1990s in response to economic crisis and the limited coverage of IMSS/ISSSTE. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s a chain of pharmacies selling nonbioequivalent generics 
under the mark Similares (Similars) expanded in low-income areas throughout the 
country.40 The emergence of Farmacias Similares gave local firms that had traditionally 
supplied the state sector opportunities to sell to private pharmacies. The actors in the 
chain were closely related, in fact, with the leading producer of nonbioequivalent 
generics (Laboratorios Best) owned by the same person who owned the Farmacias 
Similares chain, a physician-pharmacist-industrialist named Victor González Torres, 
also known as “Dr. Simi.”41 
The Similares sector and its allies in Congress spearheaded the initiative to reform 
the patent system. In December 2002 Dr. Simi’s nephew, a Green Party (PVEM) 
member of the Chamber of Deputies, presented an initiative that would reform the 1991 
LPI by reducing patent terms to ten years in the case of serious health situations. The 
PVEM initiative would have violated Mexico’s TRIPS and NAFTA requirements for 
twenty-year patent terms, but instead of rejecting the proposal out of hand, the Science 
and Technology Commission (CCyT) modified it. For all the proposal’s faults, its 
motivations and context were not to be ignored. Escalating drug prices were making 
access to medicines a growing problem, and as the initiative’s authors emphasized, 
other developing countries (such as Brazil) were demonstrating the feasibility of 
health-oriented patent reforms. Thus, the president of the CCyT acknowledged the 
concerns expressed by the bill’s sponsors and decided to rewrite the proposal with 
proper legal assistance.42 
While the original proposal addressed patent terms (Article 23), the revised bill 
addressed CLs (Article 77), an area where Mexico had discretion under TRIPS and 
NAFTA. In March 2003 the CCyT approved a modest reform that would increase the 
capacity of the SH to issue CLs in the case of health emergencies. The key elements 
were to make a state of “serious illness” declared by the SH a ground for CLs, to 
simplify the process by which serious illness is declared, and to assure rapid issue of 
CLs at low royalties. 
The March 2003 bill, similar in many ways to Brazil’s 1999 CL reform, drew a 
sharp reaction from the transnational pharmaceutical industry and its local 
representatives. Government officials and legislators found themselves besieged by 
letters, faxes, e-mails, phone calls, and personal visits from the transnational sector’s 
trade association (AMIIF), Mexico’s leading law firms, the USTR, and foreign 
embassies (for example, of the United States and Switzerland). 
The transnational sector did not just react defensively but went on the offensive, 
converting the threat into an opportunity. AMIIF had attempted to terminate the patent 
reform project, though once it was kept alive by the CCyT, AMIIF and its allies 
mobilized to secure a reform that would make the granting of CLs less likely than 
under the 1991 law.43 The campaign was successful, as the transnational sector 
essentially commandeered the initiative. The Fox government, never compelled by IP 
reform in the first place, joined the counteroffensive. The Secretary of Government’s 
legislative liaison insisted that the March 2003 version could not proceed and 
provided the CCyT with a revised text.44 This new version, which was passed by the 
full Chamber of Deputies and Senate and then signed into law by President Fox in 
2004, increases the obstacles to issuing compulsory licenses by making the process by 
which serious illness declared more complicated, removing serious illness as a ground 
for a CL, and requiring high minimum royalty rates.45 
The transnational sector also secured favorable changes with regard to post-patent 
generic entry. In September 2003, at the same time as the reform to the patent law was 
in the Senate, the Fox government announced a new linkage system that requires 
health authorities to consult with the IP office and deny marketing authority to drugs 
where patents remain in effect. Thus, while Brazil’s prior consent measure integrates 
health criteria into patent policy, Mexico’s linkage system subordinates health policy to 
patent criteria. 
Mexico also introduced an early working provision at this time, but this is largely 
undermined by the transnational sector’s ability to secure routine adjustment of the 
expiration dates on pipeline patents.46 The Mexican IP law stipulates that pipeline 
patents expire in Mexico on the same date as they expire in the first country where the 
patent was filed. These clauses, though contested in courts, essentially commit Mexico 
to adjust expiry dates. Because patent terms are adjusted in Mexico when they are 
adjusted in the original country, industry actors cannot know when a drug’s patent 
will expire, which makes it difficult to take advantage of any opportunities created 
by the early working provision. 
The changes introduced to Mexico’s IP system (and health regulatory structure 
more generally) mean that the prices of patented drugs remain higher in Mexico. 
Patent-holding pharmaceutical firms do not fear CLs, and thus feel little compulsion to 
reduce prices. Abbott, for example, prices its patented version of lopinavir/ritonavir 
at more than five times the Brazilian price, but the Mexican government lacks the 
instruments to negotiate price reductions. More accurately, such instruments, as they 
previously existed, were dulled by the reforms of 2003–04. 
To make sense of the perverse experience of IP reform in Mexico, where an 
initiative to enhance the rights of knowledge-users ended up yielding a set of changes 
that strengthen the rights of knowledge-owners, it helps to consider the changing 
political economy of the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast to Brazil, where 
INTERFARMA’s positions are regularly countered by rival actors, in Mexico AMIIF 
dominates the sector economically and politically. Of course, individual Mexican firms 
would benefit from Brazilian-style patent reforms, as originally approved by the CCyT, 
yet outside of Farmacias Similares (and its subsidiary firms and suppliers) not even the 
local pharmaceutical sector provided support for the favorable version of the CCyT’s 
initiative or opposed the revised and unfavorable version. Nor did they much contest the 
linkage system. 
The early and, with the inclusion of pipeline patents, retroactive introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents transformed Mexico’s pharmaceutical sector. Through the 
mid–1980s the national pharmaceutical sector thrived on reverse-engineering 
unpatented drugs.47 By the late 1990s, however, trade liberalization had undermined 
the pharmochemical sector and patent protection transformed the industrial structure. 
The decline of local firms in Mexico was much more accentuated than in Brazil. 
Mexican firms account for less than 15 percent of sales. In fact, nearly two-thirds of 
Mexico’s pharmochemical firms disappeared from 1987 to 1998 as the sector became 
subject to import competition and patent protection.48 
The transformation in industrial structure is reflected in the realm of politics. 
Whereas AMIIF and the principal association representing local firms (CANIFARMA) 
were arch-enemies during the IP debates of the 1980s and early 1990s, by the early 
2000s they were speaking with one voice. Indeed, the organizations were formally 
fused, with the president of CANIFARMA an invited member of AMIIF’s board and 
the CANIFARMA’s two-year presidency alternating between Mexican and foreign 
firms. Nor does Mexico have an equivalent to Brazil’s ABIFINA. Instead, the 
pharmochemical sector’s representative body consists of a small unit within a broader 
multisectoral industrial chamber of manufacturing industries (CANACINTRA), 
which itself experienced dramatic decay in this period.49  In short, Mexico’s 
pharmaceutical and pharmochemical producers could not articulate positions 
independent from the transnational sector’s because the local sector was neither 
economically nor politically independent. 
A potential source of support for the CCyT’s initiative was from the segment of 
industry that focuses on bioequivalent generics, represented by the National 
Pharmaceutical Association (ANAFAM). Yet this organization found itself in stark 
decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with a shrinking membership. In fact, 
ANAFAM did not represent a national pharmaceutical sector either, for this segment 
was undergoing trans-nationalization of its own, with international generic firms 
purchasing long-established Mexican firms.50 ANAFAM’s strategizing in response to 
the CCyT initiative reflects this politically precarious position. ANAFAM advised 
CANIFARMA that, despite the likelihood that members of the two organizations 
would benefit from the proposed reform, they should lay low and refrain from 
showing support to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest.51 Fighting on two 
fronts—against AMIIF and Similares—and politically unstable on account of its 
own transnationalization, the bioequivalent generics sector was in no position to lend 
its support to the CL initiative, nor to oppose the revised pro-AMIIF version. 
CANIFARMA and ANAFAM’s economic and political weakness meant that 
AMIIF came to dictate the positions of the pharmaceutical industry on matters of policy. 
The lone alternative voice came from the Similares sector—purveyors of 
nonbioequivalent medicines (which most countries, including Mexico, are eliminating 
from the market) and closely tied to the fringe PVEM. AMIIF, thus, was able to do 
better than prevent Mexico’s patent law from being reformed—a la Brazil—to 
simplify CLs. The transnational sector engineered reforms to Article 77 and the health 
regulatory system that strengthen the rights of knowledge-owners. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article a framework is introduced for comparing countries’ patent systems, and 
Brazil and Mexico’s distinct trajectories of patent policy since the late 1990s are 
explained. On each of three dimensions—what knowledge can be owned as property, 
the rights of owners versus users of property, and the effective duration of property 
owners’ rights—the Brazilian tendency has been to increase the capacities of 
knowledge-users while the Mexican tendency has been to reinforce the rights of 
knowledge-owners.52 
This article brings politics to bear on a topic that has been dominated by analyses 
of laws and formal international agreements. Comparing Brazil and Mexico, for 
example, focusing on external legal obligations calls attention to NAFTA, which 
includes IP provisions that differ from TRIPS (Table 2). Yet this is an insufficient 
explanation. As of the late 1990s the health dimensions of the two countries’ patent 
systems were similar, and the subsequent divergence did not conform to unique 
obligations that Mexico had under NAFTA.53 All the reforms implemented in Brazil 
would be acceptable under NAFTA too. 
The divergence is attributable to distinct interests and alliances over IP policy. In 
Brazil the nature of government demand for patented and expensive drugs made 
health-oriented IP reform a high priority, and the political and economic 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector facilitated the creation of a coalition for 
IP reform. In Mexico, however, a less comprehensive response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic made IP reforms less compelling, and a transformed pharmaceutical 
sector not only prevented coalition-building for health-oriented IP reform but 
facilitated a countermobilization that strengthened the rights of patent owners. The 
argument is not that local pharmaceutical sectors drove policy change, but that 
their economic and political characteristics affected the receptiveness to such policy 
initiatives. The Brazilian reforms were state-led, but they were feasible because the 
government could elicit the support of local actors that had retained valuable 
economic and political assets. Different legacies of industrialization combined with 
Brazil’s comparatively later retiring of industrial policies and introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents meant that Brazil was less advanced along the 
pharmaceutical-denationalization curve than Mexico. 
To the extent that the argument rests on the actions of Brazilian and Mexican health 
officials, it is not a matter of institutional structure but power vis-à-vis society. Brazil’s IP 
reforms were spearheaded by Health Minister José Serra, a close ally of the President 
who would run for the presidency in 2002, and Brazil’s health activism certainly needs to 
be understood in this larger political-electoral context. Yet Mexico’s Health Secretary 
Julio Frenk was a prominent figure within President Fox’s cabinet as well. Mexico moved 
toward universalizing health coverage under Frenk’s tutelage, a measure that reflects the 
Secretary’s authority. Yet state power is situational and relational, depending on what 
societal allies are available and against what opponents. The nature of Mexico’s 
transnationalized pharmaceutical sector meant that Frenk could not, and therefore would 
not, attempt to go down the Brazilian path. 
To understand the importance of industrial structure, consider a counterfactual—the 
Mexican government was not motivated to pursue health-oriented IP reform, but suppose 
that it were so inclined. It is difficult to imagine how the SH could have created the sort of 
pro-reform coalition as Brazil’s MH did, because the early introduction of pharmaceutical 
patents and the subsequent transformation of the sector deprived it of potential allies. 
Indeed, on a number of issues related to health provision, Mexico’s SH sought the 
collaboration of local producers only to be stymied by AMIIF’s dominance of the sector 
and the absence of local interlocutors. Industrial transformation and denationalization have 
political as well as policy consequences. 
Emphasizing industrial structure aims to supplement (not substitute) prevailing 
emphases on Brazilian civil society’s role in pushing government to make AIDS treatment 
a high priority and introduce health-oriented IP reforms. Whatever inspired the Brazilian 
government to act, local industry was crucial in not blocking, and indeed eventually 
supporting, the reforms. The difference with Mexico, where domestic industry ended up 
actively opposing health-oriented IP reforms and effectively supporting a strengthening of 
patent holders’ rights hand-in-hand with the transnational sector, is stark. 
To conclude, it is worth returning to the two areas where IP matters: technology and 
industrialization, and health and humanitarianism. The analysis bridges these two realms, 
for the key variable explaining differences between Brazil and Mexico has been the 
existence of indigenous pharmaceutical and pharmochemical capacities. An earlier 
generation of scholarship argued that promotion of local pharmaceutical sectors may be 
important for industrial development, but that because promotional measures may also 
raise the final prices of medicines, such strategies were less beneficial on the humanitarian 
axis of development.54 The argument and findings in this article invert this line of 
reasoning: to use IP to achieve humanitarian goals, countries also need to use IP to achieve 
industrial goals. They need local pharmaceutical industries that can act as a countervailing 
political force to the transnational sector. Indeed, whereas previous scholarship has 
depicted pharmaceutical development as good for industrialization but not for 
humanitarianism, this article shows how pharmaceutical development may be good for 
both, because it makes humanitarianism politically feasible in the world of strong IP. The 
key to reforming patent systems to increase access to drugs is the presence of 
economically and politically autonomous, national pharmaceutical industries as coalition 
partners for those advocating such reforms. 
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